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We examine the relationship between quantum contextuality (in both the standard Kochen-
Specker sense and in the generalised sense proposed by Spekkens) and models of quantum theory in
which the quantum state is maximally epistemic. We find that preparation noncontextual models
must be maximally epistemic, and these in turn must be Kochen-Specker noncontextual. This im-
plies that the Kochen-Specker theorem is sufficient to establish both the impossibility of maximally
epistemic models and the impossibility of preparation noncontextual models. The implication from
preparation noncontextual to maximally epistemic then also yields a proof of Bell’s theorem from
an EPR-like argument.
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The nature of the quantum state has been debated
since the early days of quantum theory. Is it a state
of knowledge or information (an epistemic state), or is
it a state of physical reality (an ontic state)? One of
the reasons for being interested in this question is that
many of the phenomena of quantum theory are explained
quite naturally in terms of the epistemic view of quan-
tum states [1]. For example, the fact that nonorthog-
onal quantum states cannot be perfectly distinguished
is puzzling if they correspond to distinct states of real-
ity. However, on the epistemic view, a quantum state
is represented by a probability distribution over ontic
states, and nonorthogonal quantum states correspond to
overlapping probability distributions. Indistinguishabil-
ity is explained by the fact that preparations of the two
quantum states would sometimes result in the same ontic
state, and in those cases there would be nothing existing
in reality that could distinguish the two.
Several theorems have recently been proved showing
that the quantum state must be an ontic state [2, 3].
Most of these have been proved within the ontological
models framework [4], which generalizes the hidden vari-
able approach used to prove earlier no-go results, such
as Bell’s theorem [5] and the Bell-Kochen-Specker theo-
rem [6, 7]. However, each of these new theorems rests on
auxiliary assumptions, of varying degrees of reasonable-
ness. For example, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem
[2] assumes that the ontic states of two systems prepared
in a product state are statistically independent, and the
Colbeck-Renner result [3] employs a strong “free choice”
assumption that rules out deterministic theories a priori.
An explicit counterexample shows that these proofs can-
not be made to work without such auxiliary assumptions
[8].
The requirement of ontic quantum states is perhaps
the strongest constraint on hidden variable theories that
has been proved to date. It immediately implies prepa-
ration contextuality (within the generalised approach to
contextuality of Spekkens [9]), a version of Bell’s the-
orem, and that the ontic state space must be infinite,
with a number of parameters that increases exponentially
with Hilbert space dimension. See [10] for a discussion of
these implications. However, the auxiliary assumptions
used in the proofs of the onticity of quantum states carry
over into these corollaries whereas the original proofs of
these results [5, 9, 11] did not require them. For this rea-
son, it is interesting to look for results addressing the on-
tic/epistemic distinction that are weaker than completely
ontic, but can be proved without auxiliary assumptions,
since such results may sit near the top of a hierarchy of
no-go theorems.
Recently, one of us introduced a stronger notion of
what it means for the quantum state to be epistemic and
proved that it is incompatible with the predictions of
quantum theory without any auxiliary assumptions [12].
An ontological model is maximally ψ-epistemic if the
quantum probability of obtaining the outcome |φ〉 when
measuring a system prepared in the state |ψ〉 is entirely
accounted for by the overlap between the correspond-
ing probability distributions in the ontological model.
This property is required if the epistemic explanation of
the indistinguishability of nonorthogonal states is to be
strictly true. It is satisfied by the ψ-epistemic model of
two-dimensional Hilbert spaces proposed by Kochen and
Specker [4, 7], and its analog is satisfied by the epistemic
toy model of Spekkens [1].
In this letter, we explain how this stronger notion of
quantum state epistemicity relates to other no-go theo-
rems, particularly the traditional notion of noncontextu-
ality used in proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem and
Spekkens notion of preparation contextuality. Briefly,
Kochen-Specker noncontextuality applies to determinis-
tic models, and says that if an outcome corresponding
to some projector is certain to occur in one measure-
ment then outcomes corresponding to the same projec-
tor in other measurements must also be certain to oc-
2cur. Preparation noncontextuality says that preparation
procedures corresponding to the same density operator
must be assigned the same probability distribution. Our
results can be summarized as:
Preparation noncontextual⇒ Maximally ψ-epistemic
⇒ Kochen-Specker noncontextual. (1)
Both implications are strict, which we demonstrate with
specific examples of models that are Kochen-Specker non-
contextual but not maximally ψ-epistemic, and maxi-
mally ψ-epistemic but not preparation noncontextual.
Since the no-go theorem for maximally-epistemic mod-
els does not require auxiliary assumptions, these impli-
cations provide a stronger proof of preparation contextu-
ality and Bell’s theorem than those obtained from other
no-go theorems for ψ-epistemic models.
We are interested in ontological models that reproduce
the quantum predictions for a set of prepare-and-measure
experiments. The experimenter can perform measure-
ments of a set of orthonormal bases M = {M1,M2, . . .}
on the system. Let P = ∪M∈MM denote the set of
quantum states that occur in one or more of these bases.
Prior to the measurement, the experimenter can prepare
the system in any of the states in P .
An ontological model for M specifies a measure space
(Λ, dλ) of ontic states. Each state |ψ〉 ∈ P is associ-
ated with a probability distribution µψ(λ) [13] [14] over
Λ and each measurement M ∈ M is associated with
a set of positive response functions ξM (α|λ) that sat-
isfy
∑
|α〉∈M ξM (α|λ) = 1 for all λ ∈ Λ. The ontologi-
cal model is required to reproduce the Born rule, which
means that ∀ |ψ〉 ∈ P ,M ∈M, |α〉 ∈M,
∫
Λ
ξM (α|λ)µψ(λ)dλ = |〈α|ψ〉|
2 . (2)
For each state |ψ〉 ∈ P , define Λψ = {λ|µψ(λ) > 0}.
We assume that Λ = ∪|ψ〉∈PΛψ, since otherwise there will
be superfluous ontic states that are never prepared. Two
important facts, of which we make repeated use, are that:
in order to reproduce |〈ψ|ψ〉|2 = 1 in Eq. (2), for everyM
that contains |ψ〉 it must be the case that ξM (ψ|λ) = 1
almost everywhere on Λψ; and for all orthogonal |φ〉 ∈M ,
such that |〈φ|ψ〉|2 = 0, ξM (φ|λ) = 0 almost everywhere
on Λψ. This implies that Λψ ∩ Λφ is of measure zero for
orthogonal |ψ〉 and |φ〉.
A ψ-ontic ontological model is one in which, for any
pair of nonorthogonal quantum states |ψ〉 6= |φ〉, Λψ ∩Λφ
is of measure zero. This means that, if one knows the
ontic state then the prepared quantum state can be iden-
tified almost surely. Conversely, if Λψ ∩ Λφ has positive
measure for some pair of states, then the model is ψ-
epistemic.
An ontological model is maximally ψ-epistemic if∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|
2
for every |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ P .
Since ξM (φ|λ) = 1 almost everywhere on Λφ, then∫
Λφ
ξM (φ|λ)µψ(λ)dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|
2
. The probability of ob-
taining the outcome |φ〉 when measuring a system pre-
pared in the state |ψ〉 is entirely accounted for by the
overlap between µψ and µφ.
The traditional notion of noncontextuality used in
proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem is the combina-
tion of two conditions:
1. An ontological model is outcome deterministic if
ξM (α|λ) ∈ {0, 1} almost everywhere on Λ, for all
M ∈M, |α〉 ∈M .
2. An ontological model is measurement noncontex-
tual if, whenever M,M ′ ∈ M contain a common
state |α〉, ξM (α|λ) = ξM ′(α|λ) almost everywhere
on Λ.
Theorem 1. If an ontological model of M is maximally
ψ-epistemic then it is also outcome deterministic and
measurement noncontextual.
Proof. The proof closely parallels that of the “quantum
deficit theorem” [15]. As mentioned above, for any |φ〉 ∈
P , ξM (φ|λ) = 1 almost everywhere on Λφ for every M ∈
M that contains |φ〉. Hence, it is also equal to 1 almost
everywhere on Λφ∩Λψ , since Λψ has positive measure. In
order to reproduce the Born rule, the ontological model
must satisfy
∫
Λ
ξM (φ|λ)µ(λ)ψdλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|
2
, (3)
but a maximally ψ-epistemic theory must also satisfy
∫
Λφ
ξM (φ|λ)µψ(λ)dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|
2
. (4)
Given that these two equations must hold for all |ψ〉 ∈ P ,
comparing them yields ξM (φ|λ) = 0 almost everywhere
on Λ\Λφ. Thus, the model is outcome deterministic.
Since the same argument holds for every M in which |φ〉
appears, the model is measurement noncontextual.
The implication in this theorem is strict, i.e. there ex-
ist Kochen-Specker noncontextual models that are not
maximally ψ-epistemic. An example is provided by the
Bell-Mermin model [6, 16], in whichM consists of all or-
thonormal bases in a two-dimensional Hilbert space. The
ontic state space of the model consists of the cartesian
product of two copies of the unit sphere Λ = S2 × S2,
and we denote the ontic states as λ = ( ~λ1, ~λ2), where
~λj ∈ S2. For a state |ψ〉, let ~ψ denote the corresponding
Bloch vector. The distribution associated with |ψ〉 in the
ontological model is a product µψ(λ) = µψ( ~λ1)µψ( ~λ2),
where µψ( ~λ1) = δ( ~λ1 − ~ψ) is a point measure on ~ψ [17]
and µψ( ~λ2) =
1
4pi
is the uniform measure on S2. It is
easy to see that this model is not maximally ψ-epistemic
3because Λψ ∩ Λφ = ∅ for distinct |ψ〉 and |φ〉 due to the
δ-function term. In fact the model is ψ-ontic.
The response functions of the model are
ξM (α|λ) = Θ
(
~α ·
(
~λ1 + ~λ2
))
, (5)
where Θ is the Heaviside step function,
Θ(x) = 1, x > 0 (6)
= 0, x ≤ 0. (7)
This model is outcome deterministic because Θ only
takes values 0 and 1, and it is measurement noncontex-
tual because the right hand side of Eq. (5) does not de-
pend onM . It is straightforward to check that the model
reproduces the quantum predictions.
In order to understand the connection between maxi-
mally ψ-epistemic models and preparation contextuality,
we need to describe how (proper) mixtures are repre-
sented in ontological models. Assume that, in addition
to preparing the pure states in P , the experimenter can
also prepare mixtures of them by generating classical ran-
domness (by flipping coins, rolling dice, etc.) with proba-
bility distribution pj and then preparing a different state
|ψj〉 ∈ P depending on the outcome, resulting in the
density operator ρ =
∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj | [18]. The classical
randomness is assumed to be independent of the ontic
state of the quantum system, so that the distribution
over ontic states associated with preparing the ensem-
ble E = {pj, |ψj〉} is µE =
∑
j pjµψj (λ). An ontological
model is preparation noncontextual if µE(λ) depends only
on the density operator ρ, and not on the specific ensem-
ble decomposition, E = {pj, |ψj〉}, used to prepare it.
Otherwise the model is preparation contextual.
Theorem 2. Suppose an ontological model of M is
not maximally ψ-epistemic, so that there exist states
|ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ P such that∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ < |〈φ|ψ〉|
2 . (8)
Then, if P includes the states
∣∣ψ⊥〉 , ∣∣φ⊥〉 that satisfy〈
ψ⊥
∣∣ψ〉 = 0 and 〈φ⊥∣∣φ〉 = 0, and are in the subspace
spanned by |ψ〉 and |φ〉, then the model is also preparation
contextual.
Proof. By Eq. (2), for any M containing |φ〉,
|〈φ|ψ〉|2 =
∫
Λ
ξM (φ|λ)µψ(λ)dλ (9)
≥
∫
Λφ
ξM (φ|λ)µψ(λ)dλ =
∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ, (10)
where the last line follows because ξM (φ|λ) = 1 almost
everywhere on Λφ. By assumption, the inequality must
be strict, so we have∫
Λφ
ξM (φ|λ)µψ(λ)dλ <
∫
Λ
ξM (φ|λ)µψ(λ)dλ (11)
This means that there must be a set Ω of ontic states
that is disjoint from Λφ, is assigned nonzero probability
by µψ, and is such that ξM (φ|λ) > 0 for λ ∈ Ω. Now,
consider the two mixed preparations:
1. Prepare |ψ〉 with probability 1/2 and
∣∣ψ⊥〉 with
probability 1/2.
2. Prepare |φ〉 with probability 1/2 and
∣∣φ⊥〉 with
probability 1/2.
The resulting density operators, ρ1 and ρ2, satisfy ρ1 =
ρ2 =
1
2
Π, where Π is the projector onto the subspace
spanned by |ψ〉 and |φ〉. Let Λ1 = Λψ ∪ Λψ⊥ and
Λ2 = Λφ ∪ Λφ⊥ be the supports of the corresponding
distributions, µ1 =
1
2
(µψ + µψ⊥) and µ2 =
1
2
(µφ + µφ⊥),
in the ontological model. Now, Λ1∩Ω is assigned nonzero
probability by µ1, whereas µ2 assigns probability zero to
Ω. This is because Λφ is disjoint from Ω by definition and
µφ⊥ must assign zero probability any set of ontic states
that assign nonzero probability to |φ〉 in a measurement
of any orthonormal basis that contains it. Hence µ1 and
µ2 must be distinct because their supports differ by a set
of positive measure.
A simple corollary of this theorem is that, whenever the
states
∣∣ψ⊥〉 and ∣∣φ⊥〉 are in P for every |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ P , then
any preparation noncontextual ontological model is also
maximally ψ-epistemic. As in the case of Kochen-Specker
contextuality, this implication is strict, i.e. there are max-
imally ψ-epistemic models that are preparation contex-
tual. An example is provided by the Kochen-Specker
model [7], which again takes M to be all orthonormal
bases in a two-dimensional Hilbert space. This time, the
ontic state space is just a single copy of the unit sphere
Λ = S2 and the ontic states are unit vectors ~λ ∈ S2. The
probability distribution associated with a quantum state
|ψ〉 is
µψ(~λ) =
1
π
Θ(~ψ · ~λ)~ψ · ~λ (12)
and the response function associated with a quantum
state |φ〉 is
ξM (φ|λ) = Θ(~φ · ~λ). (13)
It is straightforward to check that this model reproduces
the quantum predictions.
The model is maximally ψ-epistemic because Λφ =
{λ|Θ(~φ · ~λ) = 1} and thus
|〈φ|ψ〉|2 =
∫
Λ
ξM (φ|λ)µψ(~λ)dλ (14)
=
∫
Λ
Θ(~φ · ~λ)µψ(~λ)dλ (15)
=
∫
Λφ
µψ(~λ)dλ. (16)
4On the other hand, the model is preparation contextual
as can be seen by considering the two preparations:
1. Prepare |+z〉 with probability 1/2 and |−z〉 with
probability 1/2.
2. Prepare |+x〉 with probability 1/2 and |−x〉 with
probability 1/2.
Both preparations correspond to the maximally mixed
state, but the distributions 1
2
(µ+z + µ−z) and 12 (µ+x +
µ−x) are different. In particular, both µ+z and µ−z
are zero on the equator whereas µ+x and µ−x are both
nonzero here.
Theorem 1 implies that any proof of the Kochen-
Specker theorem is sufficient to establish that maximally
ψ-epistemic models are impossible for Hilbert spaces of
dimension greater than two. Unlike the proof in [12],
however, this does not establish a bound on how close to
maximally ψ-epistemic one can get. Further, the Kochen-
Specker theorem allows a finite precision loophole [19]
that can be exploited to allow noncontextual theories to
get arbitrarily close to quantum statistics, so it seems
unlikely that this proof could be made robust against
experimental error.
Combining the two theorems also shows that the
Kochen-Specker theorem is enough to establish prepa-
ration contextuality. Whilst it was known that prepara-
tion noncontextuality implies outcome determinism for
models of quantum theory [9], it is a novel implication
that it also implies measurement noncontextuality. This
demonstrates that the ontic/epistemic distinction is use-
ful for understanding the relationship between existing
no-go theorems.
Finally, the type of preparation contextuality estab-
lished by our results can be used to prove Bell’s theorem.
Briefly, if |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are states such that
∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ < |〈φ|ψ〉|
2
(17)
then we can demonstrate nonlocality using a maximally
entangled state 1√
2
(
|ψ〉A |ψ〉B +
∣∣ψ⊥〉
A
∣∣ψ⊥〉
B
)
. Since
the reduced density matrix on Bob’s system is
ρ =
1
2
(
|ψ〉〈ψ|+
∣∣ψ⊥〉〈ψ⊥∣∣) (18)
=
1
2
(
|φ〉〈φ|+
∣∣φ⊥〉〈φ⊥∣∣) , (19)
by the Schro¨dinger-HJW theorem [20] there are two mea-
surements that Alice can perform, the first of which will
collapse Bob’s system to |ψ〉 or
∣∣ψ⊥〉 with 50/50 proba-
bilities, and the second of which will collapse it to |φ〉 or∣∣φ⊥〉 with 50/50 probabilities. However, theorem 2 es-
tablishes that these two ensembles cannot correspond to
the same probability distribution over ontic states. Thus,
the distribution on Bob’s side must depend on the choice
of measurement that Alice makes, which implies Bell non-
locality. This argument generalizes the proof of [4], which
showed that local theories would have to be ψ-epistemic.
In fact, we see that they would have to be maximally ψ-
epistemic. Filling in the formal details of this argument
can be done in a similar way to [4].
Whilst the impossibility of a maximally ψ-epistemic
theory clarifies what can be proved about contextuality
based on the ontic/epistemic distinction without auxil-
iary assumptions, it is not sufficient to establish the con-
straints on the size of the ontic state space that follow
from having fully ontic quantum states [11]. If one could
prove, without auxiliary assumptions, that the support of
every distribution in an ontological model must contain
a set of states that are not shared by the distribution
corresponding to any other quantum state, then these
results would follow. Whether this can be proved is an
important open question.
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